On November 13, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed the first comprehensive rewrite of its executive-pay disclosure rules in twenty years. The proposal, Release No. 33-11455 (File No. S7-2026-39), would limit the “named executive officers” that a company must report on to its chief executive and chief financial officers, replace the familiar Summary Compensation Table with three new tables, raise the minimum for disclosing perquisites from $10,000 to $150,000, and trim the pay-versus-performance, clawback and pay-ratio requirements added after the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.
This is a proposal, not a rule: the comment period runs 60 days from the proposal’s publication in the Federal Register, and the release as retrieved for this article still carries a placeholder where that date will go. Nothing has changed for any company yet. The proposal matters beyond Washington compensation lawyers because executive pay disclosure is one of the standard tools investors use to judge incentives, including for the growing number of listed companies and new issuers whose businesses touch digital assets. This article sets out what the SEC proposes, uses the SEC’s own burden estimates to size the change, explains the stated reasoning, and lists the questions investors and commenters are likely to raise. It does not evaluate any specific company’s pay and it takes no side on the policy.
For examples of company-filing analysis, see the Anthropic IPO S-1 deep dive and how to read neocloud earnings.
In this article
- Key takeaways
- What the SEC proposed
- The three new tables
- Fewer named executives
- Perquisites
- Pay versus performance, clawbacks and pay ratio
- The CD&A, director pay and other changes
- Sizing the change with the SEC’s own estimates
- The stated reasoning
- Questions investors and commenters are likely to raise
- Why a crypto-focused reader might care
- What happens next
- Sources and research limits
Key takeaways
- Named executive officers (NEOs) would be limited to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer. The SEC’s fact sheet says that reduces the number from typically five or more individuals to two in most circumstances.
- Three new tables would replace the current tabular requirements, including the Summary Compensation Table: a Granted Compensation Table, an Earned Compensation Table and a Status of Equity Awards Table.
- The aggregate perquisite reporting threshold would rise from $10,000 to $150,000 per NEO, a fifteen-fold increase (calculation).
- Pay-versus-performance disclosure would cover three years instead of five, only the PEO and PFO, and a single performance measure, cumulative total shareholder return; the “compensation actually paid” calculation would be replaced by the total from the Earned Compensation Table.
- The pay-ratio median employee would be drawn from U.S. full-time employees only and recalculated every five years instead of every three.
- Using the release’s own paperwork estimates, the proposal would cut annual Form 10-K burden by about 1,713,847 hours and $338.1 million, roughly 15 percent of current Form 10-K burden for both measures (calculation), and the five affected forms and schedules together by about 1,773,730 hours and $350.1 million.
- The comment period is 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. The proposal is not in force.
What the SEC proposed
The Commission’s fact sheet lists the highlights of the changes to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, the rule that governs executive and director compensation disclosure. The proposal would limit the NEOs to the PEO and PFO, consolidate the main tables into three, revise the interpretive guidance on perquisites, make the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) more principles-based, simplify the Dodd-Frank-related pay-versus-performance, clawback and pay-ratio disclosures, and streamline director compensation disclosure.
The release also touches many other parts of the rulebook. Its cover page lists amendments to Items 201, 402, 403, 404, 601 and 1011 of Regulation S-K; Rule 405 of Regulation S-T; Forms S-1, S-11 and S-4 under the Securities Act; and, under the Exchange Act, Rules 14a-6, 14a-21, 14c-5, Schedule 14A, Schedule 14C and several forms. That breadth is why the Commission’s burden table below covers the annual report, current report, proxy and information statement and an investment company form.
The three new tables
The current Summary Compensation Table combines salary, bonus, stock and option awards at grant-date fair value, and other items in a single presentation that many investors find hard to read. The proposal would replace it. According to the fact sheet, the replacement has three parts.
| New table | What it would show | Treatment of equity awards |
|---|---|---|
| Granted Compensation Table | The primary elements granted in the fiscal year: salary, non-equity awards including cash bonuses, and equity awards, typically at target value. It aims to show the compensation opportunity granted for each covered year. | Equity shown typically at target value when granted |
| Earned Compensation Table | All material compensation earned in the covered years: salary, non-equity awards, equity awards, retirement contributions, and perquisites and other miscellaneous compensation. It aims to show compensation outcomes. | Stock awards deemed earned once vested; option awards deemed earned once exercised, so value earned on awards granted in prior years appears |
| Status of Equity Awards Table | Tracks each equity award from the first year it appears in the Granted table until it is reflected as earned or has fully expired. It aims to bridge the other two tables. | Award-by-award, over the full lifecycle |
The idea is a separation between what a board decided to offer and what the executive actually ended up with. For an issuer whose pay includes large equity grants, the two numbers can differ widely, especially when the share price moves. The proposal would show both in a consistent structure. The fact sheet’s choice of “target value” for grants and “vested or exercised” for earned amounts is a policy decision, and investors who prefer grant-date fair value or realizable-value measures may comment on it; the fact sheet does not say whether those alternatives were rejected.
Fewer named executives
Under the current rule a company discloses compensation for the PEO, the PFO and the three most highly compensated other executive officers. The proposal would limit the NEOs to those who served as PEO or PFO during the last completed fiscal year. The fact sheet says this reduces the number of NEOs from typically five or more individuals to two in most circumstances. A footnote in Commissioner Uyeda’s statement observes that to find the three highest-paid other executives, companies currently often have to calculate summary compensation for a much larger group of people.
The release cites commenters on the cost side. A survey by the Center on Executive Compensation, quoted in the release, found that limiting disclosure to the CEO and CFO would reduce hours worked by 30 to 50 percent. A law-firm survey quoted in the release said issuers would save approximately 50 to 60 percent of hours. The release also quotes another law firm suggesting that disclosure be limited to the chief executive and any other officer on the board, on the basis that the other positions do not provide material information. These are commenter claims reproduced in the SEC’s release, not findings by this blog.
The trade-off is visible in the numbers. With two NEOs instead of five or more, investors would see pay for fewer people, and in a company where, for example, a chief technology officer or chief operating officer drives the business, that officer’s pay would not be reported unless the person is the PEO or PFO. That is a reasonable subject for comment letters from investors, and the proposal’s supporters argue that most investors do not look beyond the top positions. The release itself quotes a commenter saying that too many executives and investors do not care about decisions beyond the CEO, CFO and top-paid other officer.
Perquisites
The perquisite changes are among the most concrete in the fact sheet.
| Element | Current | Proposed |
|---|---|---|
| Aggregate minimum reporting threshold per NEO | $10,000 | $150,000 |
| Individual perquisites that are de minimis fringe benefits under Internal Revenue Code Section 132(a)(4) | Counted toward the threshold | Excluded when computing whether the threshold is met, so they would not need to be tracked |
| Test for whether a benefit is “integrally and directly related” to the job | Current interpretive guidance | Registrants given discretion, if the determination is reasonable and made in good faith |
| Examples of items requiring disclosure, including security at a personal residence or during personal travel | Included in the guidance | Removed |
The threshold increase is a factor of fifteen (150,000 divided by 10,000). For readers who follow companies with security-heavy or travel-heavy executive arrangements, the removal of the examples is the notable change: the fact sheet specifically names security at an executive’s personal residence and during personal travel as examples that would no longer appear in the guidance. The release’s own illustration, in a worked example, imagines security at a personal residence and during personal travel of $1 million a year; the fact sheet does not address how that example would be treated, and this article does not read more into it.
Pay versus performance, clawbacks and pay ratio
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 directed the SEC to adopt say-on-pay, pay-ratio, pay-versus-performance and clawback rules. Commissioner Uyeda’s statement says the Commission took these up one at a time without considering how they work together within Item 402. The proposal would simplify each.
| Requirement | Current | Proposed per the fact sheet |
|---|---|---|
| Pay versus performance: measure of pay | “Compensation actually paid” (CAP), derived by specialized calculations | Replaced with the total shown in the Earned Compensation Table |
| Pay versus performance: period | Five years | Three years |
| Pay versus performance: performance measure | Not limited to total shareholder return | Limited to the registrant’s cumulative total shareholder return |
| Pay versus performance: covered executives | Current NEO group | PEO and PFO only |
| Clawbacks | Certain disclosure about application of the recovery policy; two check boxes on Forms 10-K, 20-F and 40-F about correcting prior financial-statement errors | Reduced disclosure; both check boxes removed |
| Pay ratio: population for the median employee | All employees, U.S. and non-U.S., full-time, part-time, seasonal and temporary | U.S. full-time employees, excluding seasonal and temporary |
| Pay ratio: how often the median employee is determined | Every three years | Every five years |
| Pay ratio: annual total compensation methodology | Existing method | Uses information from, or the methodology of, the Granted Compensation Table |
Two observations follow. First, the pay-versus-performance change is a substitution of measures. CAP, the number most commentators regard as the hardest to calculate, would give way to the Earned Compensation Table total, and the performance comparison would use a single measure, cumulative total shareholder return. For companies whose share price is highly volatile, which describes many crypto-related issuers, a single total-return measure will tend to dominate the picture, so the earned-pay figure and the return figure may move together more than under a multi-measure approach. That is an inference by this blog, not a statement in the release.
Second, the pay-ratio change narrows the comparison base. A company with a large non-U.S. workforce, which includes many global crypto and fintech businesses, would measure its “median employee” among U.S. full-time staff only. The ratio would then say less about the company as a whole. The SEC’s stated rationale is cost and the congressional mandate; the fact sheet says the changes are intended to simplify and reduce burden while still maintaining disclosure of material information.
The CD&A, director pay and other changes
The CD&A would be pared to three required topics, with no list of examples: the objectives of the compensation program in relation to the corporate strategy; the material elements of compensation and how the amounts are determined; and, where applicable, whether and how the most recent say-on-pay vote has been considered. Director compensation would continue to require qualitative and quantitative disclosure of the material aspects of the program and the amounts earned by each director, with fewer prescriptive presentation requirements.
The fact sheet lists further changes. Quantitative estimates of payments in hypothetical termination or change-in-control scenarios would be replaced by qualitative disclosure of material terms. Golden parachute disclosure would be streamlined with more room for narrative. Registrants using long-form registration statements such as Form S-1 would get up to 120 days after fiscal year-end to provide executive compensation disclosure for the last fiscal year, the same as short-form filers. And two disclosure items would be eliminated: those on risk-management-related compensation policies and practices, and on grants of equity awards close in time to the release of material nonpublic information.
The last two deletions are the kind of change a careful reader will want to examine in the full release. The fact sheet gives no rationale for each individually, and the explanations are in the release’s discussion sections, which this article has not summarized item by item.
Sizing the change with the SEC’s own estimates
The release contains Paperwork Reduction Act tables that estimate how many hours and how much cost the proposal would remove from existing information collections. They are the SEC’s numbers, based on its assumptions, and the release says it has tried to be conservative in estimating reductions.
| Form or schedule | Current annual burden hours | Decrease in hours | Current cost burden | Decrease in cost | Decrease as share of hours (calculation) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Form 10-K | 11,425,648 | 1,713,847 | $2,254,117,579 | $338,117,627 | 15.0% |
| Form 8-K | 446,650 | 4,385 | $59,643,418 | $585,816 | 1.0% |
| Schedule 14A | 816,349 | 52,410 | $163,269,774 | $10,723,100 | 6.4% |
| Schedule 14C | 39,756 | 3,080 | $7,951,194 | $634,921 | 7.7% |
| Form N-CSR | 202,306 | 8 | $5,455,736 | $1,188 | under 0.01% |
Summing the five rows gives a decrease of 1,773,730 hours and $350,062,652 a year (calculation), of which Form 10-K accounts for about 97 percent of the hours. The 10-K figure rests on 6,740 affected annual responses at 254.28 hours and $50,165.82 per response. On the SEC’s numbers, then, the proposal removes about 15 percent of the estimated Form 10-K paperwork burden, in both hours and dollars, because the per-response figures scale identically. Divided across 6,740 filers, the decrease equals roughly $50,166 per Form 10-K response. That is an average over all filers. It is not a prediction for any one company, and the release does not claim it is.
The stated reasoning
The Chairman’s statement describes the proposal as comprehensive reform of Item 402 that, with other proposed actions, is central to an agenda of “transforming the SEC’s public company disclosure regime to one rooted in materiality.” He says the last comprehensive review was twenty years ago, with the 2006 amendments, and that since then the rule has become “bloated” through congressionally mandated and discretionary additions. He calls the proposal the second of three pillars: in May the Commission proposed creating two categories of public companies with calibrated disclosure for each, and the staff is working on the third phase, reform of the business, risk and governance requirements of Regulation S-K. He also describes the philosophy as “prescribing the minimum effective dose of regulation.”
Commissioner Uyeda’s statement says the proposal aims to untangle a framework that “has, for decades, grown by accretion rather than design,” adds that the 2025 Executive Compensation Roundtable showed the accumulation is costly and in some cases loosely tied to what a reasonable investor needs, and says the Commission’s role is “to ensure investors have the material information they need to evaluate compensation decisions, not to shape or influence those compensation decisions themselves.” He cites the 1990s episode in which limiting the tax deductibility of salaries above $1 million accelerated the shift toward equity-based pay.
These are the positions of the commissioners who wrote statements and are characterized as such. This article read only those two statements and did not determine the Commission’s vote or whether any commissioner dissented. A reader who wants the full range of views should read the comment letters when they are filed.
Questions investors and commenters are likely to raise
The following are questions, framed by this blog, that follow from the design of the proposal. They are not claims from the SEC or from any commenter.
- Does limiting the NEOs to the PEO and PFO leave out officers whose pay is material to a particular business, such as a founder who is neither chief executive nor chief financial officer?
- Is “target value” for granted equity a good enough proxy for what a board intended, especially when grants are denominated in units or tokens and the target value is set well before the grant date?
- With the equity-grant-timing disclosure close to material nonpublic information removed, how will investors identify the pattern of awards granted just before good news, which the fact sheet says is the subject of the eliminated item?
- Will a single performance measure, total shareholder return, capture the performance of companies whose strategy is not mainly about share price over three years?
- Does restricting the pay-ratio population to U.S. full-time employees make the ratio comparable across companies with very different workforce geographies?
- How will issuers use the new discretion over perquisites, and will comparability across companies suffer?
Why a crypto-focused reader might care
The proposal does not mention digital assets in the fact sheet or in the passages read for this article. The relevance is indirect. Investors in listed companies with crypto exposure, whether exchanges, miners, asset managers or companies holding digital assets as a treasury position, use the same Item 402 disclosure as every other investor. Executive pay in those companies may be tied to share price or to business metrics, depending on the company. What the proposal would change is the form in which that information is disclosed, with fewer people covered and different tables, not the underlying incentives.
A second link is timing. The proposal would give long-form registrants such as Form S-1 filers up to 120 days after fiscal year-end to provide the compensation disclosure for the last fiscal year. A company that files a registration statement early in a calendar year could benefit from the change. This article does not apply the point to any specific issuer.
What happens next
- Publication of the release in the Federal Register, which starts the 60-day comment clock. The release as retrieved leaves the date blank.
- Public comments, submitted through the SEC’s comment form for File No. S7-2026-39 or by email to rule-comments@sec.gov, which the Commission will post.
- Any revisions in a final release, which, as with any proposal, could differ from this one.
- The Commission’s announced third phase, reform of the business, risk and governance disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K, which the Chairman’s statement says staff is working on.
Sources and research limits
Proposal details come from the SEC’s press release 2026-114, the fact sheet and the proposing release, Release No. 33-11455, in the form posted on November 13, 2026 with a Federal Register date placeholder. The reasoning section summarizes the statements of Chairman Atkins and Commissioner Uyeda on the SEC’s statements page. All burden figures are copied from PRA Tables 2 and 3 of the release; the percentages, sums and per-response averages are calculations by the blog.
Limits: the release runs several hundred pages and this article read the cover, fact sheet, the burden tables and selected discussion passages, not every section. It does not address the economic analysis in detail. Commenter views come only from the passages the release quotes, not from the comment file. The vote was not established. The article describes a proposal that may change, takes no view on whether the changes are good policy, and is not investment or legal advice.