The Federal Reserve Board’s proposed rule for implementing the GENIUS Act is a 104-page document, published in the Federal Register on September 29, 2026 under Docket No. R-1899, with comments due Monday, November 30, 2026. It covers Board-supervised payment stablecoin issuers, the firms that hold their reserves, and a prohibition on tying that applies to every permitted payment stablecoin issuer, whoever supervises it. A shorter companion proposal, announced the same day, sets out how Board-supervised banks would apply to issue stablecoins through a subsidiary.
This guide explains the proposal in plain English: what it would require on reserves, redemption, capital, examinations and custody, how it relates to the OCC’s final rule that the KCEX blog already covers in the OCC final stablecoin rule, and what the deadlines are. Everything below describes a proposal. Nothing in it is final, the Board may change any provision after reviewing comments, and the guide is educational rather than legal or investment advice.
For the operational custody workflow behind the reserve discussion, see how bank digital-asset custody works for institutions.
In this article
- Key takeaways
- The basics: who the proposal covers
- Reserves: what “fully backed” would mean
- Redemption: a two-business-day outer limit
- Capital: tangible equity and a $5 million floor
- Supervision: exams, reports and custody
- Marketing, permitted activities and the tying ban
- State-qualified issuers and the Board’s backup role
- How the Fed proposal relates to the OCC final rule
- Dates to keep in view
- How to read a proposed rule without over-reading it
- What the documents do not say
- Sources and research limits
Key takeaways
- The Fed’s proposal is a notice of proposed rulemaking, not a final rule. Comments must be received by November 30, 2026.
- The GENIUS Act was enacted on July 18, 2025. Its effective date is the earlier of 18 months after enactment, which is January 18, 2027, or 120 days after the primary federal payment stablecoin regulators issue final regulations, according to the Fed’s document.
- The OCC’s separate final rule, published October 23, 2026, is effective January 18, 2027, and the OCC says it received approximately 328 comments on its proposal.
- The proposal would require Board-supervised issuers to hold identifiable, segregated reserves with a fair value at least equal to outstanding issuance, and would cap redemption timing at two business days, subject to two safe harbors.
- Regulatory capital would be defined as tangible equity, with a $5 million floor, indexed to nominal U.S. GDP, during a three-year “de novo” period.
- The Board would conduct a full-scope examination of every Board-supervised issuer at least once every 12 months, unless an extended cycle applies to smaller issuers.
- The comment deadline falls 49 days before January 18, 2027 (calculation: November 30 to January 18).
The basics: who the proposal covers
The GENIUS Act, in the words of the Fed’s document, “establishes a regulatory framework for issuers of ‘payment stablecoins.’” The Act defines a payment stablecoin as a digital asset that is, or is designed to be, used as a means of payment or settlement and whose issuer is obligated to convert, redeem or repurchase it for a fixed amount of monetary value and represents or creates a reasonable expectation that it will maintain a stable value relative to that amount. The definition excludes national currency, deposits and securities as defined in specified federal statutes.
In general, the Act prohibits anyone other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer, or PPSI, from issuing a payment stablecoin in the United States. It also bars digital asset service providers from offering or selling a payment stablecoin to a person in the United States unless the issuer is a PPSI or a foreign issuer that meets certain requirements. The Board’s proposal covers entities the Board supervises, namely subsidiaries of State member banks, and State-qualified issuers where the Board has authority under sections 4 or 7 of the Act. It also covers the Act’s ban on tying in section 4(a)(8), which applies to all PPSIs.
The proposal describes itself as “one piece of the GENIUS Act’s implementing regulations.” The Board is concurrently proposing application procedures for insured State member banks seeking approval to form a stablecoin subsidiary, and it notes that other Board regulations may need changes, including thresholds that depend on bank asset size and might be amended to exclude stablecoin reserves.
Reserves: what “fully backed” would mean
The proposal would turn the Act’s one-to-one reserve requirement into specific tests. A Board-supervised issuer would need reserve assets that are identifiable, that are segregated from other assets and not available to satisfy creditor claims other than through redemption unless and until all payment stablecoins have been redeemed at par, and that at all times have a total fair value equal to or greater than outstanding issuance. Reserves would have to be held in custody by an eligible custodian, as an eligible deposit claim, as money in an account at a Federal Reserve Bank, or by the issuer itself.
The Fed’s press release describes the permissible reserve assets as “certain permissible reserve assets, such as short-term Treasury bills and certain other high-quality, liquid assets,” and the Federal Register text refers to eight permissible reserve asset types in the Act. This guide does not list all eight, because doing so would require reproducing the statute, and the primary document should be consulted for the list.
| Reserve topic | What the proposal says |
|---|---|
| Backing ratio | At least one-to-one with outstanding payment stablecoins, per the Act |
| Identifiability | Reserve assets must be identifiable, with records showing ownership and legal entitlement |
| Segregation | Segregated, not commingled, and not available to creditors other than through redemption until all coins are redeemed at par |
| Fair value test | Total fair value at all times equal to or greater than outstanding issuance |
| Where held | Eligible custodian, eligible deposit claim, Federal Reserve Bank account, or by the issuer, including through a wholly owned subsidiary with no liabilities whose assets are pledged to secure the stablecoin obligations |
| Diversification | No prescriptive diversification rules proposed at this time; the Board asks whether there should be |
Two design choices are worth noticing. First, the Board says it is not proposing money-market-fund-style daily or weekly maturity requirements, reasoning that permissible reserve assets trade in highly liquid markets that support intraday or next-day settlement. It gives examples such as monetizing Treasury securities through overnight repurchase agreements or selling them for same-day cash. Second, the Board asks in a numbered question whether a buffer is needed, noting that without one the fair value of reserve assets could fall below the required minimum if, for example, interest rates rise suddenly.
Redemption: a two-business-day outer limit
The proposal would require a Board-supervised issuer to publicly disclose its redemption policy, including the timeframe in which it will redeem and the timeframe it is required to meet. Under proposed section 247.12(b)(2), “timely” would mean no later than two business days after the date of the requested redemption. The Board describes this as an outer limit and asks, in Question 97, whether the timeframe is right, listing alternatives ranging from one calendar day to seven calendar days and asking whether anything longer than seven would be appropriate.
The proposal also includes two safe harbors. The Board would not take action for a failure to redeem within two business days if the issuer can demonstrate to the Board’s satisfaction that additional time was necessary to complete customer identification and due diligence required by Bank Secrecy Act, sanctions or anti-money-laundering rules, or that the delay was outside its control. The document gives unforeseen third-party bank or custodian processing delays as an example of the second category, and says such circumstances would not extend to delays owed solely to a higher-than-expected number of redemption requests. Reliance on either safe harbor depends on the issuer making all reasonable efforts to resolve the delay in a timely manner.
Why the redemption rule is tied to reserve liquidity
The Fed’s economic analysis says that a maximum redemption timeframe may add cost for issuers compared with no deadline because, all things being equal, a shorter window increases the need for liquid reserve assets. That is the link between the two sections: a two-day redemption promise only works if reserves can be converted to cash within that period, and the proposal relies on the statutory list of reserve assets to ensure it.
Capital: tangible equity and a $5 million floor
The proposal would define regulatory capital for Board-supervised issuers as tangible equity. That would comprise common stock, cumulative and non-cumulative perpetual stock, retained earnings and accumulated other comprehensive income, all as reported under generally accepted accounting principles, and it would exclude goodwill and other intangible assets such as intellectual property. The Board explains that tangible equity reflects the capital available to absorb unexpected losses in a stress event without relying on outside support.
The proposal would build the minimum requirement from five components, listed in the document. They are a requirement for the credit risk of uninsured eligible deposit claims, one for the counterparty credit risk of undercollateralized reverse repurchase agreements, an indirect-exposure requirement for reserve assets held through certain registered government money market funds, requirements for financial risks from non-reserve assets, and an operational risk requirement.
| Capital component | What it addresses |
|---|---|
| Uninsured eligible deposit claims | Credit risk from insured depository institutions holding reserve deposits |
| Undercollateralized reverse repurchase agreements | Counterparty credit risk after haircuts |
| Indirect exposure | Credit risk through eligible registered government money market funds |
| Non-reserve assets | Financial risks from assets other than reserves, using the parent bank’s approach where there is one |
| Operational risk | Issuing and redeeming coins, managing reserves and other activities, based on outstanding issuance and non-reserve revenue |
The operational-risk discussion is notable for how specific it is about technology. The Board says a hack of a smart contract could lead to unauthorized minting of unbacked stablecoins, which could undermine compliance with the one-to-one requirement. It lists other risks such as coding errors in smart contracts, transaction-processing errors such as sending redemption funds to the wrong recipient, and failures affecting a blockchain on which the stablecoin transacts. It also notes that distributed ledger technology can mitigate some risks, for instance by enabling delivery-versus-payment settlement.
The de novo floor
During a three-year “de novo” period after initial approval to issue, a Board-supervised issuer would be subject to the higher of a $5 million floor and its risk-based total minimum capital requirement. The $5 million figure would be indexed to nominal U.S. GDP. The Board points out that the OCC also proposed a $5 million threshold, and that the OCC had determined minimum capital amounts ranging from $6.05 million to $25 million would be necessary to establish a viable business model. The Board may extend or shorten the de novo period, and may raise or lower the requirement, if it determines the revised amount is sufficient to ensure ongoing operations.
The Board also asks about alternatives, including whether more than 50 percent of tangible equity should be in voting common stock, related surplus and retained earnings (Question 148), whether to limit cumulative perpetual preferred stock (Question 149), and whether to add an interest-rate-risk capital requirement, which it describes considering in the form of capital equal to projected fair-value losses under a scenario in which rates rise by two percentage points (Question 174).
Supervision: exams, reports and custody
The Board proposes to conduct a full-scope examination of every Board-supervised issuer at least once during each 12-month period, unless an exception applies, and says this mirrors its current examination practices for State member banks. The proposal includes an extended exam cycle for certain smaller issuers, with thresholds of less than $1 billion in outstanding issuance value and less than $25 billion in total monthly trading volume, both indexed. The Act itself authorizes primary regulators to examine issuers that are not State-qualified and have less than $10 billion in outstanding issuance.
Subpart C would apply to Board-supervised custodians that hold payment stablecoin reserves, stablecoins used as collateral, or private keys used to issue stablecoins. Section 10 of the Act requires such custodians to be supervised by a federal or state supervisor, treat covered assets as customer property, separately account for them and not commingle them except under listed exceptions, and give their supervisor regulatory information. The proposal would define “covered assets,” set principles-based requirements to protect them from claims of the custodian’s creditors, and implement other requirements and exclusions in the Act.
Marketing, permitted activities and the tying ban
- Permitted activities. The proposal mirrors the statute: issuing and redeeming payment stablecoins, managing reserves, and providing custody or safekeeping for stablecoins, reserves or private keys. Lending or issuing stablecoins as the proceeds of a loan would not be a permitted activity, and issuers could assess fees associated with purchasing or redeeming.
- Deceptive names and claims. The proposal would bar representing that stablecoins are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, guaranteed by the U.S. Government, or subject to federal deposit insurance or share insurance, while allowing issuers to describe themselves as regulated under the GENIUS Act.
- Non-stablecoin digital assets. An issuer could not hold non-payment-stablecoin digital assets beyond what is reasonably expected to be necessary to meet near-term demand for fees or near-term testing of a distributed-ledger platform, and the Board asks in Question 30 whether to codify that limit.
- Tying. Under section 4(a)(8), a PPSI may not provide services on the condition that the customer obtain an additional paid product or service from the issuer or its subsidiaries, or agree not to obtain an additional product or service from a competitor. Subpart E would apply to all PPSIs, and the Board may allow exceptions that are not contrary to the Act’s purpose.
State-qualified issuers and the Board’s backup role
Subpart F covers State-qualified issuers. The Board describes a “unique relationship” with state stablecoin regulators, including information sharing under section 7(c) and optional memoranda of understanding under section 7(b) under which the Board may take part in supervision, examination and enforcement. The proposal addresses two matters: the Board’s backup-enforcement authority during unusual and exigent circumstances, and the transition and waiver process for uninsured state-chartered depository institutions. Questions 201 and 202 ask about the approach to memoranda of understanding and information sharing.
How the Fed proposal relates to the OCC final rule
The OCC issued a final rule, published in the Federal Register on October 23, 2026 as document 2026-21706. It is effective January 18, 2027, and the OCC says it received approximately 328 comments from crypto companies, trade groups, banks, non-profits, academics and individuals. Several commenters asked the OCC to re-propose aspects that were inconsistent with other agencies’ proposals, and the OCC responded that the Act becomes effective January 18, 2027 and that it is important that its regulations be effective as of that date. For the OCC’s rule in more depth, see the KCEX article on the OCC final rule.
The Fed’s proposal says many of its provisions are similar to the notices of proposed rulemaking the OCC, FDIC and NCUA released. The Board tagged questions that are similar to the OCC’s and invites commenters to explain differences between its approach and the others. The $5 million de novo floor is one visible point of alignment, because the Board expressly cites the OCC’s $5 million threshold.
| Feature | Fed (proposed) | OCC (final) |
|---|---|---|
| Document type | Notice of proposed rulemaking, Docket R-1899 | Final rule, Docket ID OCC-2025-0372 |
| Federal Register date | Sept. 29, 2026 | Oct. 23, 2026 |
| Length (Federal Register pages) | 104 | 195 |
| Status | Comments due Nov. 30, 2026 | Effective Jan. 18, 2027 |
| Coverage | Board-supervised issuers, custodians, state-qualified issuers; tying for all PPSIs | Entities subject to OCC jurisdiction |
The comparison shows that the two documents are at different stages. A reader should not assume that every Fed proposal will track the OCC’s final text, since the Board is asking for comment on whether to follow or differ from it.
Dates to keep in view
| Date | Event | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Sept. 29, 2026 | Fed proposals published in the Federal Register | Past |
| Oct. 23, 2026 | OCC final rule published | Past |
| Nov. 30, 2026 | Comment deadline for the Fed implementation proposal | Future date |
| Jan. 18, 2027 | GENIUS Act effective date, and OCC final rule effective date | Future date; the Act’s date is the earlier of this date and 120 days after final regulations |
The Federal Register record lists November 30, 2026 as the comment close date. That is 62 days after publication (calculation), slightly longer than the 60 days described in the Fed’s press release, which said the period would close 60 days after publication. The primary document’s date is the one to use.
How to read a proposed rule without over-reading it
- Separate proposals from requirements. “Would require” means the Board proposes to require it. Nothing is binding until the Board adopts a final rule.
- Read the questions. The numbered questions, which run through Question 254, show where the Board is uncertain and what alternatives it is considering.
- Look for cross-references. The Board links many questions to the OCC’s, which helps show where agencies are aligned.
- Watch the thresholds. Dollar thresholds such as $5 million, $1 billion and $25 billion are proposals that may change and are indexed.
- Check what the statute already decides. Self-executing provisions, such as those on preemption of state consumer protection laws, are not subject to this rulemaking.
- Do not infer market effects. The documents do not forecast effects on any stablecoin’s supply or market share.
What the documents do not say
- They do not say when the Board will finalize any part of the proposal.
- They do not identify any specific company that will apply for approval.
- They do not forecast stablecoin supply, adoption or prices.
- They do not say how the Board will respond to comments.
- The comment-letter content is not available for this guide because the comment period is still open.
Sources and research limits
Primary sources: Federal Register, “Implementing the Federal Reserve Board’s Responsibilities Under the GENIUS Act,” document 2026-19860, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/29/2026-19860/implementing-the-federal-reserve-boards-responsibilities-under-the-genius-act; Federal Reserve Board press release of September 24, 2026 at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20260924a.htm; and Federal Register, OCC final rule, document 2026-21706, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/23/2026-21706/implementing-the-guiding-and-establishing-national-innovation-for-us-stablecoins-act-for-the. The related application-procedures proposal is described only from the press release.
Limits: this guide summarizes selected sections of a long proposal and does not reproduce the full text or the economic analysis. Descriptions of the proposal use the Fed’s own wording where possible. All dates in the future are scheduled or statutory dates and not outcomes. Day counts are calculations. Nothing here is legal, regulatory or investment advice.